literary criticism: a cognitive approach (3 ) Herbert Simon

Taking Up the Challenge:

Herbert Simon and his Peers 'round the Table

If cognitive science is to live up to this challenge it is compelled to offer a theory whose basic elements are applicable to literature. In other terms, it ought to provide the basic concepts and methods used in any account of the production and interpretation of literary texts. It is precisely this goal that Herbert Simon takes up in the article that we present as the opening of this debate. Simon's paper has two aims. First, he tries to provide a cognitive science-based theory of a central concept of the general theory of thinking-the concept of meaning. Second, he wants to show how his theoretical account can be applied to the explanation of literary texts. Or, more precisely, he wants to show how such an account of meaning-of its production, retrieval, storage, etc.-can provide the infrastructure to be later used by literary critics in their trafficking with such texts.

This program is obviously pregnant with consequences. What is at issue is an encounter between a humanistic discipline and a science, the latter trying to lay out the ultimate foundations, the basic tools and elementary axioms of the former. The conflict might resolve itself in several ways.

Literary criticism can accept the proposal and redefine its goal: to work out the details of a general architecture of the mind supplied by cognitive science in the specific case of the production and interpretation of literary texts. This would affirm Herbert Simon's prophecy that "criticism can be viewed (imperialistically) simply as a branch of cognitive science."

Alternatively, literary criticism can refuse the cognitive scientific intervention and try to stake out (or preserve) a theoretical space exclusively for itself. In doing so, it can challenge, for instance, cognitive science's ability to do justice to literature-to its desirable ambiguity, its holistic effects, and so on. In other words, literary critics could argue that cognitive science's instrumental definitions of meaning, context, etc., might have some (if any) use within a certain very narrow view of language, but are otherwise useless to understand the complexity of the literary phenomena. Operational definitions and processes outlined by cognitive science, it could thus be argued, programmatically exclude, from the beginning, all the aspects of language that really matter to literature: its essential instability, its performative aspects, etc.

There is yet a third option: literary criticism can choose not only to reject the "friendly offer," but to launch a counterattack. It could try to show that cognitive science's approach is not only insufficient for an "explanation" of literature, but that the shortcomings of cognitive science in this particular case point to more general theoretical problems endemic to the entire cognitive territory. In other words, a literary critic unsatisfied by the cognitive scientist's treatment of the literary may take cognitive science's explanatory inadequacy in literary matters as an indication of problems that are or will be afflicting cognitive science on its own home ground.

With the latter move, the confrontation would be completely inverted. In fact, it would be only a small further step to claim that any investigation of cognition must start not from cognitive science's traditional assumptions, but from the form of reflection on thinking manifest in the analysis of literature and poetry, and then to conclude that any comprehensive science of human thinking cannot but adopt literary criticism's starting point. Most importantly, it would also have to adopt literary criticism's methodology and standards of rigor.

Arrival at this point would certainly constitute the most interesting juncture in this debate. The relationship between the two disciplines would be forced to assume an asymmetric form in which one of the two tries to lay the ground and provide the theoretical foundations for the other. Is this a juncture to be avoided, or, despite its prima facie awkwardness, is there anything to be learned in "being there"? We have cognitive science, on the one hand, which offers to provide ultimate theoretical foundations for criticism, and expects to receive, in exchange, a wealth of "raw data" on which to test its theories. Literary theory, on the other hand, envisions something similar, but inverted in form: if what literature is will forever escape scientific reduction, then science (cognitive science, in particular) will always be in an ancillary position with respect to literary theory. From this perspective, it will be literature's prerogative to provide the more general horizon of sense within which science in general and cognitive science in particular, are constrained to set their direction.

From what we have said one might expect encounters between the two disciplines to assume more the form of heated confrontation between rivals than tranquil discussion among fellow travelers. It is worth noting, however, that among the thirty-three peer commentaries to Herbert Simon's provocative proposition, we find reactions of all sorts-from aggravated refusal to enthusiastic welcome, to suggestion to meet in the middle ground-any adequate categorization of which would have to reach deeper than simple disciplinary alliance. We hope that the debate that follows will be a step towards thinking further about gaps and bridges, and that we can all meet again on similar ground.





Note

1. For the purposes of this introduction, given Herbert Simon's central position in both Cognitive Science and Artificial Intelligence, we will be glossing over the many differences between the research programmes and methodological commitments of these two disciplines. In doing so, we will also be disregarding various alternative movements internal to Cognitive Science and Artificial Intelligence. That is, we take "cognitive science" to refer just to what Herbert Simon's research programme contains (what John Haugeland has dubbed GOFAI: Good Old Fashioned AI (Haugeland, 1985)), ignoring both the connectionist research line (epitomized in Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986) , and the "situated action" perspective (see, for instance, the special issue of Cognitive Science on "Situated Action", 17, 1, 1993).






SEHR, volume 4, issue 1: Bridging the Gap

Updated 8 April 1995


Editor's note: Professor Simon's article appears here in 5 parts. This is the first part.


literary criticism: a cognitive approach <<文學批評:Simon認知科學觀點>>


part 1


Herbert Simon



--Je comprends mal ce texte--

--Laissez, laissez! Je trouve de belles choses. Il les tire de moi. . . .

Paul Valery, Instants




In this paper, I will be acting as an unabashed missionary for contemporary cognitive science, which is itself an amalgam of artificial intelligence, cognitive psychology, and linguistics, with a few other trace substances (e.g., anthropology, epistemology) thrown in. I will argue that cognitive science has reached a point in understanding human thinking where it can say a great deal about literary criticism; in particular, that it can cast some light on the theoretical foundations of criticism and even generate useful advice for its practice. But my position is not as asymmetric as these words would make it appear. Written texts, literary and other, provide a rich source of data for understanding cognition. Enormous thought goes into the production of texts and perhaps even more (given the ratio of readers to writers) into interpreting them.

These data have not been much mined by cognitive scientists, who therefore have much to learn from literary criticism, which examines the texts in depth. Perhaps what I am attempting here should be viewed as a gesture from the cognitive side to repay a small part of the debt we owe to critics and theorists of criticism for introducing us to literary texts. The paper may also be viewed as an experiment in communication between the two cultures of the humanities and the sciences. I simply take for granted that, pace Leavis, there are two cultures, much as C. P. Snow (1959) described them

thirty years ago, and that communication between them is infrequent and then, when it occurs, noisy. I also take for granted that it is important for our society that this communication be improved substantially. 我在這篇論文要充當當代認知科學的一位義無反顧的傳教士。當代認知科學本身是一綜合體，包括人工智能，認知心理學和語言學，再加上一些專業學門(譬如說，人類學與認識論)。我要論辯認知科學對於人的理解力業已成熟到一定程度，能夠讓我們對於批評的基本理論有一番新洞識，甚至於對於批評的實務可以提供些有用的諮詢。不過，我的立論定位，並不像上述的話那般單方面切入。書寫的文本，不管是屬於文學的或他類，都能提供我們豐富的資料源來了解認知作用。人們對於文本的產生，做過相當多的思考，也許由於文本的讀者遠比作者多得太多，因此，更多的心思用在闡釋此等文本。認知科學家對於這些資料還未善加注意，因此他們可以從文學批評中學習到很多東西，因為批評是對於文本的深入撿視。也許我要做的，可以看成是從認知方面的一種試圖對於批評者和批評理論者作些微回報之舉，感謝他們將我們引導入這些文學文本。這篇論文也可以作為一種充當溝通人文與科學兩種文化的試驗。我警告自己不要像Leavis教授那樣猛攻C. P. Snow (1959)約30年前所描述的兩種文化，以致一開始就把自己弄得精疲力盡，而要假設的確有對立的兩種文化，而且兩方不常交往，即使有交往的話，也是各說各話，眾聲喧嘩。我也認為這兩方面如果能夠交流，我們的社會將會大為改進，我假設這一道理是理所當然的。(譯注：C. P. Snow (1905–1980)的兩種文化論文The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution,和其反思，有中文翻譯

，參考 《》。F. R. Leavis的反擊、嘲諷以及相關的論戰的簡介，可參考The two cultures” today by Roger Kimball (http://www.newcriterion.com/archive/12/feb94/cultures.htm#top))




Its fame got an additional boost a year later when the critic published his attack
on The Two Cultures in The Spectator. ... But the questions raised by The Two Cultures—and by
Leavis’s searching criticisms of Snow’s position—are something more serious. ...

pace yourself verb [R]
to be careful not to do something too quickly so that you do not get too tired to finish it




Literary criticism concerns (among other things) the meanings of, in, and evoked by literary texts. Cognitive science concerns thinking, by people and computers, and extracting or evoking meanings while reading and writing requires thinking. Hence, there is a wide expanse of ground common to literary criticism and cognitive science. But a casual examination of leading books from the two domains suggests that each has little awareness of the other, or of the possible relevance of the other to its concerns. With rare exceptions, there is little or no cross-referencing. 文學批評所關心的事項中，其一是文學文本的本身、其內函、以及它們所引發的種種意義。認知科學關心思維，人的和電腦的，以及從在讀、寫過程中所作的思考中所萃取的或激發出的意義。所有在文學批評與認知科學之間有相當廣大的共同園地。不過我們就上述兩領域的書籍稍加瀏覽，可以知道彼此對於對方並不自覺，或者認為彼此所關心的有可能相關。除了極少數的例外，雙方很少、甚至於全無相互參考引述。

It would be too strong to say that literary critics and theorists of literary criticism are ignorant of the social sciences. But although many of them know about Marx and Freud, fewer are acquainted with contemporary cognitive science. Only a few, like Siegfried Schmidt (1968) and Robert de Beaugrande (1980), are well versed in both literature and cognition. 如果說文學批評者和文學批評理論者者對於諸社會科學是無知的，這可能會言過其實。不過，雖然他們許多人對於馬克思和佛洛伊德耳熟能詳，不過很少人對於當代認知科學有所認識。只有少數的學者，像Siegfried Schmidt (1968) 和Robert de Beaugrande (1980)般，是精通文學與認知科學的。




It would also be too strong to say that all cognitive scientists are ignorant of literary criticism, but they certainly do not mention it often in their footnotes. Some researchers, like my colleagues John R. Hayes and Linda Flower (1980) and Patricia Carpenter and Marcel Just (1987), have studied the processes of writing and reading but have not extended their studies to works of literature. Some others, like Jean Mandler (1978) and Wendy Lehnert (1981), have analysed the "grammars" employed in the structures of stories. But the numbers of such scholars are few and the literature of the subject not large. 如果說所有的認知科學家對於文學批評者是無知的，這也可能會言過其實，不過，他們的確很少在論文的腳注提到它。一些研究者，像我的同事John R. Hayes與and Linda Flower (1980合著) 和 Patricia Carpenter 與nd Marcel Just (1987合著) ，對於讀和寫過程做過一番研究，不過他們還沒將其研究延伸到文學作品。其他像Jean Mandler (1978) 和 Wendy Lehnert (1981)分析過某些故事的結構所運用的「文法」("grammars")。不過，這類學者為數甚少，文獻也極有限。






I am a cognitive scientist, not a literary critic or a theorist of literary criticism. So I have little choice but to start from the psychological side of the gulf in building the bridge between the two domains. I will undertake to sketch the thought processes involved in writing and reading the kinds of texts that we call literary. 我是位認知科學家，不是位文學批評者或文學批評的理論者。因此，我要想為此兩領域搭建橋來跨越鴻溝的話，只有從心理學這方面開始談，別無其他選擇餘地。我要先大略描述我們在讀、寫我們稱為文學文本的思考過程。




But it is not my aspiration to create a new school of critical theory. Rather, I hope to cast some light on the relations among existing doctrines by reinterpreting them in a language that can lend to them a precision that they seldom seem to possess in contemporary literary discussion. Familiar terms like "meaning," "context," "evocation," "recognition," and "image" have gained a clarity from the researches of contemporary cognitive science that they did not have in earlier writing and still do not have in literary criticism and its theory. I will try to introduce some of that precision, divorced as far as possible from technicalities, into the discussion.不過我的抱負並不在開創一新的文學批評學派。而是希望稟新觀點，就既有的學說來找出其中的新關係，用一種當代文學討論至今少見的精確語言來重新闡述它們。我們借鏡當代認知科學的研究成果，對於某些常見術語諸如意義("meaning,") 、語境( "context,"上下文 脈絡) 、 喚起 ("evocation," ;(靈魂,神降的)引召)) 、識別( "recognition," )和形象("image")等，可以更為清楚明白，而這是文學批評及其理論建構者的作品中甚少見到的。我會試著在討論之中，一方面引進這種精確性，另一方面盡可能不用專門技術細節。

That will not be easy, for I will not be using the key terms in their ordinary senses, but in senses dependent upon a theoretical framework and formal language that I can set forth here only in broad outline. Focusing on the term "meaning" and how that term is interpreted in contemporary cognitive science will concentrate most of the technicalities and difficulties in one place. Much of the rest of the conversation can be carried on in ordinary language. If what I say sounds like common sense, so much the better. If it sounds only like common sense, then I have failed. 由於我不採取某些關鍵語的一般意思，而我在這兒只能大體提一下我依據的理論架構和正式語言，因此，我的任務並不容易。我將焦點放在意義("meaning,")這一術語與它在當代認知科學中的闡述，這樣可以集中一處來處理上述的專門技術細節和困難中的大部分。以下的談話多用普通語言。如果我說的看似基本常識(common sense)，余心竊喜。不過、如果它們看來不過爾爾，像一般所說的常識(common sense)而已，那表示我的企圖失敗了。

In recent generations there has been a great spawning of new theories and refurbished old theories of literary criticism. We have the New Criticism, now old, Structuralism, and Deconstruction. We have the New Historicism. We have text-centered theories, reader-centered theories, contextualist theories, and interactionist or constructionist ones. Some theorists place "political correctness" front and center. These do not begin to exhaust the list, but they may serve as examples. 最近幾世代，文學批評盛興，新理論紛出，將舊理論又能推陳出新。我們歷經新批評(New Criticism, 現在它不新了) 、結構主義( Structuralism)和解構(Deconstruction) 。現在有新歷史主義(the New Historicism) 。我們有「文本中心論」「讀者中心論」、「語境中心論」以及提倡「互動論」者或「建構論」者。有些論者將「政治正確」擺在最顯要地位。上述雖然未能窮舉所有學派，不過它們可以權充例子。





(人人生而平等是美國文化中與言論自由同樣根深蒂固的另一個觀念，而從此衍生的行為方式就是對少數、弱勢人群的關懷。這樣，在社會上、校園內處於少數地位的黑人、南美西裔人、亞裔、婦女（順便一提，近年來女生在美國大學的比率已經超過男生）以至同性戀者等團體都成為“保護”對象，而針對這些少數或弱勢團體所發出的帶有輕蔑、戲侮、或攻擊性的言論就成為“政治上的正確性”這個理念的鼓吹者們極力限制的目標。關於“政治上的正確性”，耶魯大學教授孫康宜曾做過一個很好的說明：

“政治正確性’（political correctness，簡稱P.C.）原指多元文化的基本原

則，主旨在維護不同性別、種族、階層之間的平等”（《耶魯·性別與文化》，

上海文藝出版社，２０００）。但是，由於許多主張多元文化的激進人士不懂得

把握尺度，把“政治正確性”的原則擴大化，無端地抨擊……)




A taxonomy of theories of literary criticism might derive from answers to the questions: How is meaning attributed to the text? Does criticism require us to ask what the author meant, what the text means, or what meaning derives from a reading

of the text? Or, as some Deconstructionists would claim, does the text extend (have meanings?) beyond its meanings? 文學批評理論的一種分類學作法，或可由回答下述問題而導出：意義是如何歸因給該文本的？批評要求我們去問作者意指什麼？該文本意指什麼？或是從讀一回該文本中導出意義？或者一如某些解構學派所宣稱的，該文本除其意義之外，更另外有延伸(意指)麼？

Some contemporary theories of criticism answer these questions by "All of the above." For, assuming that we have a theory of "meaning"--of the meaning of "meaning"--there is no reason why we should not explore what an author intended

when in the process of writing down certain words, and explore what interpretations of that sequence of words are consistent with the syntax and semantics of the language (i.e., of the community that uses it), and ask what meanings

various readers, with their various histories and experiences, are likely to extract from it. All of these seem to be wholly legitimate, if perhaps difficult, questions. 某些當代文學批評理論對於這些問題的回答是「以上皆是」因為，假設我們有一套「意義」理論—關於「意義」的意義—那我們沒理由不去追問作者在書寫某些字眼過程的意圖，並探討這些字眼順序的解釋是否與該語言(即使用它的群體)的語用學和語義學相一致？並問不同的讀者，他們的歷史和經驗各分殊，可能從中萃取出什麼意義？所有的這些問題看來是完全合法的，雖然回答起來或許相當困難。





"We hold these truths to be self-evident. . . ." To understand what Jefferson and his colleagues meant, we would have to know (at least) the extent of their acquaintance with previous writings on political theory (Locke, for example), their

beliefs about the philosophical bases for self-evidence, their understanding of and views on the political, economic, and social institutions of their times, their persuasive and rhetorical intent, and their knowledge of the audiences to which they

were addressing the Declaration. 「我們認為下述真理為不證自明(或理所當然) 的 (We hold these truths to be self-evident) ……」我們要了解美國憲法起草人傑佛遜等人的(用詞)意義，(至少)必須知道他們對於前人的政治理論的作品(譬如說，洛克的)熟悉的程度，他們對於「不證自明」的哲學基礎的信念，他們對於其時代的政治、經濟、社會的機構的了解，他們在勸說和辯論修辭上的意圖，他們對於其作品《獨立宣言》的聽眾和讀者所知道的。(譯案：關於self-evident的歷史語境，我認同於J. Bronowski等人在《西方思想史》賈士蘅譯 台北：國立編譯館 p.462 等同於「理所當然或公設般的」(axiomatic) 。)




To understand how their contemporaries read these words, we would have to answer similar questions about them. The answers might be quite different for different contemporaries. The questions would have still different answers for people

in the United States, or in Russia or China, who might read these words today. (Reflect on the meaning of the Statue of Liberty in Tiananmen Square in June of 1989 in this context.)

要了解他們那時代的人如何解讀這些字眼，我們可能必須回答關於他們的類似問題。對於這些問題的回答，就處於不同時代的人而言，可能大異其趣。這些問題對於不同國別的人，如美國人，或俄國人或中國人，他們在今日讀這些字眼的話，我們的回答也該不同。(讓我們反思在1989年6月天安門的這一脈絡下，「自由女神」的意義。)

A literary inquiry into the Declaration of Independence might ask any or all of these questions. Alternatively, it could raise questions of style. Would it have been more or less cogent (or pleasing, or rigorous) had Jefferson begun: "We can safely assume from first principles that. . . ." or "It cannot be denied that. . . ."? These, and many others, would seem to be appropriate inquiries within the domain of literary criticism.

作《獨立宣言》的文學研究，可能追問上述的任一問題或全部都問到。另外一種研究方式是，可以追問它的文體風格。如果傑佛遜採用這樣的起頭，如，「我們從第一原理出發，可以安全地假定……」("We can safely assume from first principles that. . . .")、或「無可否認的是……」("It cannot be denied that. . . .") 這樣會更使人信服(或感覺更快意或更具宗教情操) ？這些提問，如同其他許多提問，都是屬於文學批評中適當的探究。




In fact, to a cognitive scientist it is not at all clear why there are schools of literary criticism. There are many things that can be said about a literary work, many standpoints from which it can be read. As long as we identify what we are doing,

any one of these is as legitimate an enterprise as any other.[1] Of course, we may have special normative concerns. We might argue that one way of reading has certain personal or social values not possessed by another and might thereby

prefer the former to the latter. Leaving aside such normative concerns for the present, we will let a hundred flowers bloom, but without requiring that the hundred schools contend.事實上，就一位認知科學家而言，他弄不清楚為什麼文學批評會有這麼多派別。就一件文學作品而言，我們可以說的事有千萬種，解讀它的角度也一樣多。只要我們先確認我們所為何事，採取其中的任何一種進路，都屬合法的事業。[1] 當然，我們可能有特別的道德關懷要考量。我們可以辯稱其中的一種解讀方式，遠比其他的更具個人的或社會的價值，從而認為前者遠比後者更可取。現在姑且不去考慮這些道德關懷，我們希望能百花齊放，不過不要求百家學派爭鳴。





To obtain answers to any of the questions I have raised about reading and criticism, we must assign a meaning to "meaning." Of course, it might be argued (perhaps has been argued) that literary criticism merely expresses undiscussable views, or the beliefs, feelings, or values of the critic. Accepting that argument would simply end the discussion without casting any light on the issues. Instead, I will proceed on the premise that critical opinions--at least opinions that do not just assign values but attribute meanings as well--can be more or less reasonable, hence are proper subjects for rational discourse.




要取得我上文提出的關於閱讀與批評的諸問題的任一問題的回答，我們必須先賦予「意義」一番意義。當然，或許可以這樣辯稱(也許的確曾有人如此主張過) ：文學批評只不過是要表達些無法討論的觀點，或批評者的信念、感覺、或價值觀。如果我們接受這種論辯，那就無法進一步討論下去，而對於上述議題的了解，也沒助益可言。我接下來並不採取這種看法，而要這樣假設：批判的意見—至少是那些意見，它們不僅只是賦予價值，更給予意義---可以多少是合理的，因此是理性討論的適當主題。

To define "meaning," we can turn to philosophy, psychology, or that contemporary blend of those disciplines (seasoned by others as well) called cognitive science. I'll follow the latter course. Meanings flow from the intensions of people (or perhaps people and computers, a controversial issue). The people here might be authors, readers, or those somewhat amorphous clouds called "language communities."

我們要界定「意義」，可以求助哲學，心理學或當代綜合這些學科的認知科學(它還吸收其他學科之長處而更為老道) 。後者是我要採取的路徑。諸般意義從人們(或者是人與與電腦，不過這是個有爭論的議題)的種種意圖流露出。上述的人，可包括作者、讀者、或者是多少不容易定形的所謂「語言群體」。

I use "intension" in the broad sense in which this term is used in contemporary philosophy. It implies causality, but not necessarily conscious, deliberate will. In this sense, Oedipus, at least according to Freud, intended to kill his father. In the

Greek interpretation, the causality of intension is replaced by fate or cosmic necessity (but a necessity that does not expiate guilt).

我採用當代哲學中使用的廣義的「意圖」。它函蘊因果性，不過可以不必須是自覺的、或刻意的意志作用。在這樣的語義之下，(古希臘)的依底帕斯(Oedipus)，至少根據Freud的說法，有意圖弒父。古希臘人的解說方式是，用命運或廣宇的必然性(然而這一必然無法抵償罪惡)。

We might attribute intensionality to a pun if both meanings of the punning word were clearly stored in the memory of the writer, without arguing that the punning was a conscious act; for we might claim that it was caused by the stirrings of the

two meanings in memory even without the author's awareness. But these subtleties of interpretation will not generally concern us here. I mention them simply to show how we can deal with cases where understanding how certain meanings crept into a text requires a knowledge of the author's intensions in this broader sense.

我們或可將意圖性歸屬為一個雙關語，如果該用來當雙關語用的兩意義清楚地記在作者的腦中，而不用論斷說雙關語是自覺的行為；因為我們或可說，使用雙關語是由記憶中的兩串列意義所造成的，甚至作者並不自覺。然而，這兒一般不關心這種闡述上的精微之處。我之所以提它們，只不過是要顯示我們如何可以處理這樣的案例：要了解某些意義是如何進入一文本時，須要知道作者的上述的廣義意圖。

Nowhere has there been more attention to intension than in the interpretation of the American Constitution by the Supreme Court. What did the Framers intend? The huge and apparently irreducible ambiguities that this question discloses illustrate the difficulties in establishing intent or even defining it, but they do not make the question meaningless. Nor should we be misled by the legal aspects, which have a peculiar twist not present in all efforts to attribute intent. Often, the Court is not

asking what the Framers did intend--what they had in mind in writing the words they put down--but what they would intend if their words were applied to new situations they had not anticipated and, therefore, did not have in mind at all. Of course we can play this same game with the laws of Hammurabi, but we do not usually need to.

最注意意圖的案例，莫過於美國最高法院對於《憲法》的解釋了。立憲者的意圖是什麼？這一提問所揭述的釋憲歧義是巨大而顯然無法減少的，這說明要找出意圖甚至要界定它，都是問題重重，然而這並不能說我們的提問沒意義。我們也不要為其法律層面所誤導，這些考量特別糾纏，這是一般探討意圖時所沒有的情形。通常的情形是，最高法院並不問立憲者的意圖是什麼？即，他們寫下憲法這些條文文字時，腦筋想的是什麼。最高法院問的這些文字如果應用到他們未預期的情形，他們立憲者的意圖會是什麼？所以他們才不將其形之文字。當然我們也可以依照此方式來解釋《漢摩拉比法典》，不過通常我們不必如此費事。




For our purposes, it will be simplest to postulate intenders in the singular and to speak of particular persons who intend that particular strings of words should have particular meanings for particular audiences on particular occasions.[2] An assignment of meaning, then, will postulate a relation between a text and one or more persons. The same text may have (and usually will have) different meanings for different persons or for the same person at different times, and particular portions of a text may have multiple meanings even for a single person.

為本文討論方便，我們將意圖侷限在單數，在提到它時，是指某人在某場合，為某觀者說話時，該串字眼應該意指什麼。[2]這樣，一次將意義歸因於某某，就假設：在一文本與一人或多人之間有一種關係。同一文本，對於不同的人，其意義可能不同(通常如此) ，或者，意義對同一人卻因時而異；又，某一文本的某特定部分，甚至於對單一的人也可能有多重意義。

Meanings are evoked. When a reader attends to words in a text, certain symbols or symbol structures that are stored in that reader's memory come to awareness. (In psychology we might say, more ponderously, "having been noticed, the symbols

are activated or transferred from long-term to short-term or immediate memory"). This is the sense in which we will use the term "evoke" throughout this paper. It denotes a specific set of psychological processes that have been much studied in

the laboratory and in everyday life: the processes that bring meanings, or components of meaning, into attention.

意義是引發出的。讀者在注意一文本的字眼時，他記憶中的某些記號或記號結構會現出來，為他所知道。(我們心理學界的說法更沉悶些：「已被注意到，記號被從長期記憶激活或傳輸到短期記憶或立即期記憶」) 。這是我們本論文用「引發」所指的意思。它表示一組特定的心理過程，它們在實驗室中，甚至於在日長生活中，都已有大量的研究：將意義或其組成帶進注意力的過程。

The process that underlies evocation is recognition. Words in the text serve as cues. Being familiar (if they are not familiar, they will not convey meaning), they are recognized, and the act of recognition gives access to some of the information

that has been stored in association with them--their meaning (Feigenbaum and Simon, 1984). Recognizing a word has the same effect as recognizing anything else (a friend on the street). Recognition accesses meaning. 引發所強調的是再認(recognition)。文本的字眼可以作為提示。因其為熟悉的(要是它們不是你熟悉的，就無意義可言) ，它們會被再認得，而這再認之行動，可讓你接達某些你可與其聯想，而加以儲存的情報—即，它們的意義(Feigenbaum and Simon, 1984)。再認某字眼的效果，與再認其他人事物(一位朋友或一條接道)是相同的。再認可接達意義。






Notes 注




1. This point is made very cogently on page 9 of Jerry R. Hobbs's Literature and Cognition, a book to which this essay would be deeply indebted had I been acquainted with it when I delivered and then revised my 1990 Hitchcock Lectures.

此論點很中肯地在Jerry R. Hobbs著的 Literature and Cognition一書的第9頁，這本書在我發表1990 度的Hitchcock 講座和之後的修正時，失之交臂，否則我會大力參考並引用。

2. This simplification does not in any way rule out the influence of the language community on the meanings an individual assigns to a text, but it recognizes that a writer or reader is an individual, not a language community. 這一簡化怎樣都沒去除該語言群體對於個人將某意義歸因於某文件的影響力，不過它承認一位作者或讀者是一位個人，而不是一語言群體。









literary criticism: a cognitive approach