法國學者讓•梯若爾(Jean Tirole)難得地獨自一人贏得諾貝爾經濟學獎(Nobel Prize for economics)。他對如何馴服寡頭壟斷的研究，幫助改變了企業監管的方式。
瑞典皇家科學院(Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences)表示，梯若爾是“我們這個時代最有影響力的經濟學家之一”。他最大的貢獻是明晰了“如何理解和監管只有幾家強勢企業的行業”。
梯若爾是知名的圖盧茲經濟學院(Toulouse School of Economics)的創始人之一，他一直被視為諾貝爾經濟學獎的可能得主。將今年的經濟學獎授予他的決定，展現了他在創造一種新的方式來看待競爭方面的深遠影響力。
瑞典央行(Riksbank)為紀念阿爾弗雷德•諾貝爾(Alfred Nobel)而設立諾貝爾經濟學獎。對於評選該獎得主的瑞典皇家科學院來說，今年的選擇標志著它回歸爭議較少的純經濟理論領域。去年，該獎被頒發給羅伯特•席勒(Robert Shiller)、尤金•法瑪(Eugene Fama)和拉爾斯•皮特•漢森(Lars Peter Hansen)，以表彰他們在資產定價和有效市場方面有時自相矛盾的研究成果。
Jean Tirole - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jean_Tirole
Jean Tirole (born August 9, 1953) is a French professor of economics. He works onindustrial organization, game theory, banking and finance, and economics ...
“不是一個方面，而是有很多方面，”牛津大學(Oxford university)教授保羅•克倫佩勒(Paul Klemperer)表示。“他改變了人們對於工業組織的思維方式。
“他引領我們重塑對競爭政策的理解：從完美市場的簡單模型，轉向意識到不同的情況需要不同的解決方案。”
突顯他對政策制定者影響力的是，法國前財長、即將出任歐盟委員會經濟和金融事務專員的皮埃爾•莫斯科維奇(Pierre Moscovici)表示，梯若爾的“研究成果指明瞭我們終結危機的途徑”。
出生於1953年的梯若爾以分析具有強大市場實力的企業而聞名。他證明，簡單的政策規則（比如針對壟斷企業設定價格上限）有時弊大於利。
相反，通過他的文章和著作，他提出了一個設計更佳政策的總體框架，並將其應用於從電信到銀行的多個行業。他的研究成果影響了對大型科技公司如微軟(Microsoft)和谷歌(Google)的監管。
瑞典皇家科學院表示，他的研究成果是一個“極佳的例子，說明經濟理論可能具有很大的現實意義”。
譯者/和風
Overview
The Theory of Industrial Organization is the first primary text to treat the new industrial organization at the advanced-undergraduate and graduate level. Rigorously analytical and filled with exercises coded to indicate level of difficulty, it provides a unified and modern treatment of the field with accessible models that are simplified to highlight robust economic ideas while working at an intuitive level.To aid students at different levels, each chapter is divided into a main text and supplementary section containing more advanced material. Each chapter opens with elementary models and builds on this base to incorporate current research in a coherent synthesis.Tirole begins with a background discussion of the theory of the firm. In part I he develops the modern theory of monopoly, addressing single product and multi product pricing, static and intertemporal price discrimination, quality choice, reputation, and vertical restraints.In part II, Tirole takes up strategic interaction between firms, starting with a novel treatment of the Bertrand-Cournot interdependent pricing problem. He studies how capacity constraints, repeated interaction, product positioning, advertising, and asymmetric information affect competition or tacit collusion. He then develops topics having to do with long term competition, including barriers to entry, contestability, exit, and research and development. He concludes with a "game theory user's manual" and a section of review exercises.
Downloadable instructor resources available for this title: solution manual
About the Author
Jean Tirole is Scientific Director of IDEI (Institut d'Economie Industrielle), Chairman of the Board of TSE (Toulouse School of Economics), and Annual Visiting Professor of Economics at MIT.
Endorsements
"I think that this book will fill a tremendous void in the textbook market for advanced undergraduate and graduate level courses in industrial organization and applied microeconomics. The strength of Tirole's work is his masterful synthesis of analytical development and intuitive discussion. Consequently, he makes understandable to the reader some very advanced research. This synthesis will prove invaluable to graduate students who are looking for a research niche of their own." John P. Bonin , Professor of Economics, Wesleyan University"—
Jean Tirole has published about two hundred professional articles in economics and finance, as well as 10 books including The Theory of Industrial Organization, Game Theory (with Drew Fudenberg), A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation (with Jean-Jacques Laffont), The Prudential Regulation of Banks (with Mathias Dewatripont), Competition in Telecommunications (with Jean-Jacques Laffont), Financial Crises, Liquidity, and the International Monetary System, and The Theory of Corporate Finance. His research covers industrial organization, regulation, game theory, banking and finance, psychology and economics, international finance and macroeconomics.
Books[edit]
Dynamic Models of Oligopoly (with D. Fudenberg), 1986. [1]
The Theory of Industrial Organization, MIT Press. (1988) Description and chapter-preview links.
Game Theory (with D. Fudenberg), MIT Press, 1991 [2].
A Theory of Incentives in Regulation and Procurement (with J.-J. Laffont), MIT Press,1993. Description & chapter- preview links.
The Prudential Regulation of Banks (with M. Dewatripont), MIT Press,1994. [3]
Competition in Telecommunications, MIT Press, 1999 [4].
Financial Crises, Liquidity and the International Monetary System, Princeton University Press, 2002 [5].
The Theory of Corporate Finance, Princeton University Press, 2005. Description. Association of American Publishers 2006 Award for Excellence.
Balancing the Banks (with Mahttp://press.princeton.edu/thias Dewatripont, and Jean-Charles Rochet), Princeton University Press, 2010 [6].
Inside and Outside Liquidity (with Bengt Holmström), MIT Press, 2011 [7].
AFTER last year's three-way split, this year's Sveriges Riksbank prize in economic sciences in memory of Alfred Nobel goes to a single receipient, Jean Tirole of Toulouse University in France (pictured). He has been awarded the prize for his microeconomic research investigating how large firms should be regulated in order to prevent consumers being damaged by their monopolistic behaviour.
As the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences notes on its website:
Jean Tirole is one of the most influential economists of our time. He has made important theoretical research contributions in a number of areas, but most of all he has clarified how to understand and regulate industries with a few powerful firms.Many industries are dominated by a small number of large firms or a single monopoly. Left unregulated, such markets often produce socially undesirable results—prices higher than those motivated by costs, or unproductive firms that survive by blocking the entry of new and more productive ones.From the mid-1980s and onwards, Jean Tirole has breathed new life into research on such market failures. His analysis of firms with market power provides a unified theory with a strong bearing on central policy questions: how should the government deal with mergers or cartels, and how should it regulate monopolies?Before Tirole, researchers and policymakers sought general principles for all industries. They advocated simple policy rules, such as capping prices for monopolists and prohibiting cooperation between competitors, while permitting cooperation between firms with different positions in the value chain. Tirole showed theoretically that such rules may work well in certain conditions, but do more harm than good in others. Price caps can provide dominant firms with strong motives to reduce costs—a good thing for society—but may also permit excessive profits—a bad thing for society. Cooperation on price setting within a market is usually harmful, but cooperation regarding patent pools can benefit everyone. The merger of a firm and its supplier may encourage innovation, but may also distort competition.The best regulation or competition policy should therefore be carefully adapted to every industry's specific conditions. In a series of articles and books, Jean Tirole has presented a general framework for designing such policies and applied it to a number of industries, ranging from telecommunications to banking. Drawing on these new insights, governments can better encourage powerful firms to become more productive and, at the same time, prevent them from harming competitors and customers.
Unlike some previous recipients, such as Robert Engle and Clive Granger in 2003 or Eugene Fama in 2013, who won the prize for developing new econometric methods few laymen can understand, Mr Tirole's research has direct relevance to current policy issues. Most notably, his ideas of how to regulate industries dominated by a single large firm are helping to produce strategies for how to prevent Google from using its vast market share in the internet-search business to behave as a monopoly. And as we argued back in March, Mr Tirole's theories can also help us understand the impact on markets of disruptive forces such as Uber, a taxi app that matches customers and drivers. For those readers who want to read more about Jean Tirole's research and his career in more detail, here are some links that may be of interest:
From economist.com:
Microeconomics: A golden age of micro (October 2012).
Looking good by doing good: Rewarding people for their generosity may be counterproductive (January 2009).
Matchmakers and trustbusters: "Two-sided" industries intrigue economists and incite regulators (December 2005)
Journey beyond the stars: The brightest young economists are outgrowing their discipline's traditional boundaries (December 1998).
From elsewhere on the internet:
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